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Subverting the Marriage-Amendment Crusade with 
Law and Policy Reform 
Anita Bernstein* 
INTRODUCTION 
Two judicial decisions of the mid-1990s that extended civil rights 
to gay people—the Supreme Court’s Romer v. Evans1 in 1996, and 
Baehr v. Lewin2 from the Hawaii Supreme Court three years earlier—
appear in hindsight to have provoked a panic that took the shape of a 
“defense of marriage” campaign. In a 1996 statute Congress wrote a 
federal definition of marriage that insisted on the presence of one 
man and one woman in this legal category.3 Further wandering into 
what had once been states’ business, this statute, the Defense of 
Marriage Act (“DOMA”)4, also declared that no state could be 
compelled to recognize marriages where both persons in the couple 
are of the same sex.5 Over the next decade a large majority of states 
enacted their own “defense of marriage” laws.6  
 
 * Sam Nunn Professor of Law, Emory University, and Wallace Stevens Professor of 
Law, New York Law School. For assistance in the completion of this Article, I thank Susan 
Appleton, Rose Patti, Ed Rasp, and Kayser Strauss. 
 1. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 2. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). 
 3. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000). 
 4. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 1 and 28 U.S.C.). Before the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”), 
states had, as they still have, varying criteria for entry into marriage. For example, at present the 
states divide about equally on the question of whether first cousins may marry. See Joanna L. 
Grossman, Resurrecting Comity: Revisiting the Problem of Non-Uniform Marriage Laws, 84 
OR. L. REV. 433, 443 n.42 (2005). When a particular woman and man married in a state that 
permitted their union and then moved to a state that deemed them disabled from marrying each 
other, courts in the more restrictive state would frequently choose to tolerate the deviation and 
recognize the marriage. See id. at 434–47. 
 5. On Baehr as a provocation that led to DOMA, see Grant S. Nelson & Robert J. 
Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause: Applying First Principles to Uphold Federal 
Commercial Regulations but Preserve State Control Over Social Issues, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1, 
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Of this large majority, several states furthered the defense of 
marriage campaign effort by repeating their bans on same-sex 
marriage in their hardest-to-change law books, their constitutions.7 
States without such a ban in their constitutions are now in the 
minority. These state-level amendments are not only part of a 
national campaign by activists to add an anti-marriage amendment to 
the United States Constitution,8 but also ends in themselves, forcing 
thousands of couples to live outside of family law as if they were 
legal strangers.  
Working against this anti-marriage campaign, activists favoring 
access to marriage have struggled. Their resistance to defense-of-
marriage legislative proposals and ballot initiatives lacks inherently 
the rhetorical flourishes that their adversaries enjoy (such as “family 
values” and appeals to religious faith) and so, typically unable to give 
the electorate a compelling enough reason for a “no” vote, they tend 
to lose at the polls. At the federal level, proponents of same-sex 
marriage fare better: they can depict their anti-amendment argument 
as one for states’ rights, federalist laboratories, and limited national 
government.9 This strength evaporates when an individual state puts 
 
170 (1999). On Romer as provocation, see Nancy J. Knauer, Lawrence v. Texas: When 
“Profound and Deep Convictions” Collide with Liberty Interests, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 
325, 334 (2004) (“Although I do not mean to be an alarmist, it should escape no one’s attention 
that DOMA was enacted in the months following Romer, which, at the time, was a gay rights 
victory of unprecedented magnitude.”). 
 6. HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, EQUALITY IN THE STATES: GAY, LESBIAN, BISEXUAL 
AND TRANSGENDER AMERICANS AND STATE LAWS AND LEGISLATION IN 2004, at 39 (2004), 
available at http://www.hrc.org/Content/ContentGroups/News_Releases/20042/leg_report 
032004.pdf (offering interactive map of “Statewide Discriminatory Marriage Laws”). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Because “anti-same-sex-marriage” as a compound adjective is too cumbersome, this 
Article occasionally, and deliberately, says “anti-marriage.” Aware that opponents of same-sex 
marriage would prefer to be called something other than anti-marriage, I cannot think of a better 
terse label, and straining not to offend these people seems beside the point. See infra note 22 
and accompanying text (acknowledging an agenda). Using “anti-marriage” as short for anti-
same-sex-marriage seems to me no worse than using “defense of marriage” as short for denying 
gay men and lesbians the freedom to marry. The phrase “defense of marriage” perceives an 
attack on an institution that springs from homosexual interests—an attack that same-sex 
marriage activists consistently say no one is making—and takes a tendentious position on who 
exactly is the aggressor in this conflict. 
 9. For a gathering of these arguments, see Human Rights Campaign, Conservative and 
GOP Quotes on Constitutional Amendment, http://www.hrc.org/Content/NavigationMenu/ 
HRC/Get_Informed/Federal_Legislation/Index.htm (search “Conservative and GOP Quotes”; 
follow “Conservative and GOP Quotes on Constitutional Amendment” hyperlink) (last visited 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol24/iss1/6
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an initiative on its ballot. Almost every statewide ballot measure 
purporting to limit marriage to a man and a woman has passed by a 
solid majority;10 the 2006 defeat of an Arizona initiative is the lone 
exception.11 Until marriage advocates come up with improved 
oppositional strategies, or somehow achieve better results with their 
old unavailing tactics, the defense-of-marriage campaign remains 
positioned to continue its winning record at the state level. Congress 
stands in the way of a federal amendment, but the state-level success 
of the campaign brings the United States closer to a change in its own 
Constitution. 
Improved oppositional strategies will require more than recourse 
to the courts. In addition to serving unintentionally as firebrands, 
Romer and Baehr as now received also suggest that judges cannot 
rescue same-sex marriage from the amendment crusade that has 
mobilized against it.12 The cases appear not to have delivered an 
equal protection lesson to other courts in the form of precedent. 
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,13 which found a right to 
same-sex marriage in the Massachusetts constitution, did not rely on 
Romer or Baehr, and indeed barely cited them.14 In Citizens for 
Equal Protection v. Bruning15 the Eighth Circuit, approving a 
 
Apr. 9, 2007). This limited-government posture worked well for Dick Cheney as vice president 
under a president who supported amending the United States Constitution to deny marriage to 
same-sex couples. See id. 
 10. National Conference of State Legislatures, Same Sex Marriage, Civil Unions and 
Domestic Partnerships, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cyf/samesex.htm (reporting on the 
tendency of ballot initiatives to prevail by an “overwhelming majority”).  
 11. One journalist who analyzed the Arizona anomaly soon after early results came in 
argued that it is no harbinger of an end to homophobic voting around the nation; instead, the 
amendment went too far for this electorate by appearing to ban civil unions and domestic 
partnerships, a source of health insurance for many voters in the state. “The next proposition 
will be shorter and leave no room for interpretation. And it will pass easily.” Judd Slivka, Am I 
Blue? Arizona’s Flirtation with Becoming a Blue State, SLATE, Nov. 9, 2006, http://www.slate. 
com/id/2153382.  
 12. Chris Crain, Why We’re Losing Gay Marriage Cases, N.Y. BLADE, July 31, 2006, 
http://www.newyorkblade.com/2006/7-31/viewpoint/editorials/crain.cfm (arguing that the 
judiciary is a weak source of support for the same-sex marriage endeavor because judges fear 
the electorate and, in particular, the prospect of constitutional amendments). 
 13. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 14. A couple of citations are sprinkled through the majority opinion, the concurrence, and 
the dissent; none of them say much, and none of the judicial authors discuss either case in 
detail.  
 15. 455 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2006). 
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strongly worded Nebraska ban of same-sex marriage that also 
proscribed civil unions and domestic partnerships, distinguished 
Romer to hold that the Nebraska measure did not deprive lesbians 
and gay men of their right to participate in political deliberation 
because “there is no fundamental right to be free of [this] political 
barrier.”16  
In one month, July of 2006, several instances of new decisional 
law displayed the courts as a weak source of newly recognized same-
sex marriage rights. The highest court of New York—a state much 
more liberal and accepting of same-sex marriage than most, and a 
locus of hope for activists—rejected the Goodridge path on July 6, 
ruling that marriage could be withheld from same-sex applicants.17 
Also on July 6, the Georgia Supreme Court unanimously reversed a 
trial-court decision that had thrown out, on procedural grounds, a 
constitutional amendment approved by voters, removing the last 
obstacle to an anti-marriage amendment in Georgia.18 On the tenth of 
the month, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled that 
opponents of same-sex marriage could present to voters a measure 
rescinding Goodridge and banning same-sex marriage.19 On July 14, 
the Tennessee Supreme Court rejected a challenge to yet another state 
ban.20 The doctrines invoked in this July 2006 anti-marriage 
decisional law varied—federal constitutional law in Nebraska, state 
constitutional law in New York, standing in Tennessee, a state-based 
technicality sometimes called “the single subject rule” in Georgia—
but the results appear uniform. Many gay-marriage activists, seeing 
themselves as civil rights pioneers, still continue to draw inspiration 
from the fight against de jure racial segregation; but to date their 
cause has not generated a counterpart to Brown v. Board of 
Education.21 Meanwhile, the anti-marriage constitutional 
amendments accrete, undaunted by judicial intervention. 
 
 16. Id. at 868. 
 17. See Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006). 
 18. See Perdue v. O’Kelley, 632 S.E.2d 110 (Ga. 2006). 
 19. See Schulman v. Attorney Gen., 850 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 2006). The effort went on to 
fail, however, when the Massachusetts legislature rejected the proposed ban. Pam Belluck, 
Massachusetts Gay Marriage Referendum Is Rejected, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2007, at A16. 
 20. See ACLU v. Darnell, 195 S.W.3d 612 (Tenn. 2006). 
 21. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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Eschewing academic neutrality on the issue,22 this Article 
endorses policy reform as a strategy to oppose the marriage-
amendment crusade. Although partisans have been heartened by 
successes like the June 2006 vote in the Senate to reject the Federal 
Marriage Amendment23 and the slow deflating of anti-marriage 
energies since their 2004 high point,24 they have not manifested 
enough thought about a winning path. For the cohort who seek a 
marriage policy that does not take away civil rights from same-sex 
couples, the strategy of celebrating narrow votes like the Senate 
cloture count just mentioned,25 hoping that one’s fellow voters will 
find other issues to worry about, and putting faith in the difficulty of 
amending the federal Constitution adds up to inadequate coping and 
resistance.26 Subverting the marriage-amendment crusade calls for 
ideas. 
One vital source of policy-innovation ideas is a report by the 
Canadian Ministry of Justice titled Beyond Conjugality.27 This report 
starts with a premise that conjugality (meaning the romance-paired 
dyad), like intimacy generally, should be seen as a private relation—
none of your business, nor mine—unless it has public consequences. 
A heeding government might try harder to stay out of the consensual 
sexual lives of adult citizens while retaining concern with social 
welfare. As an approach to family law, “beyond conjugality” permits 
persons to declare themselves officially committed to each other, and 
 
 22. Other academics who, like me, do not wish to marry a person of the same sex have 
also eschewed neutrality on sexual-orientation civil rights. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Jennifer 
Gerarda Brown, Mark(et)ing Nondiscrimination: Privatizing ENDA with a Certification Mark, 
104 MICH. L. REV. 1639 (2006); Michael Mello, For Today, I’m Gay: The Unfinished Battle for 
Same-Sex Marriage in Vermont, 25 VT. L. REV. 149 (2000). 
 23. See Erin P. Billings, Rapid Denouement Expected on Stem-Cell Bill, ROLL CALL, July 
18, 2006. 
 24. Kirk Johnson, Gay Marriage Losing Punch as Ballot Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 
2006, at A1. 
 25. The vote was forty-nine to forty-eight. D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH 
APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW 179 (3d ed. 2006) (summarizing federal Marriage 
Amendment developments from 2004 to 2006). 
 26. Immediately after the 2006 result in the United States Senate, one opponent of same-
sex marriage made this point. See M.D. Harmon, Sooner or Later a Federal Anti-Marriage 
Amendment Will Pass, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, June 9, 2006, at A11. 
 27. CANADIAN MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, LAW COMM’N OF CAN., BEYOND CONJUGALITY: 
RECOGNIZING AND SUPPORTING CLOSE PERSONAL ADULT RELATIONSHIPS (2001) [hereinafter 
BEYOND CONJUGALITY]. 
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sometimes to have this commitment ascribed to them, without any 
suggestion that they share a physically intimate relationship.28 
Beyond Conjugality, published in 2001, recommended that the 
government instead regulate relations among persons with reference 
to human needs and functions, chief among them dependency and 
caregiving.29  
The state of Hawaii implemented a beyond-conjugality policy in 
1997 when it created “reciprocal beneficiaries,”30 and since then 
other governments and private actors have been recognizing family-
like affiliations between adults without insisting on a conjugal dyad. 
Meanwhile, American adults spend more years of their lives 
unmarried than they did in the past, and younger people report to 
surveyors a dwindling interest in pursuing marriage. Because 
individuals are growing less committed to conjugality as a source of 
entitlements and privileges in their lives—even while conjugality 
remains central to the legal category of “marriage”—the expansions 
of civil rights and liberties away from the sexual dyad are at least as 
crucial as high-stakes fights in the statehouses to subvert the 
marriage-amendment crusade. A beyond-conjugality approach to 
social welfare would continue this development.  
In commending “beyond conjugality,” however, I do not thereby 
commend all of Beyond Conjugality, and also may not be ready to 
sign Beyond Same-Sex Marriage,31 the manifesto issued also in the 
fateful month of July 2006 that urged “the idea that marriage should 
be one of many avenues through which households, families, 
partners, and kinship relationships can gain access to the support of a 
caring civil society.”32 The principle behind these two documents is 
impeccable. The imperative that marriage, like religion in the liberal 
state, must “be ‘disestablished,’” which is to say that the state should 
not be permitted to use marriage “as an avenue for accomplishing 
 
 28. Id. at 117 
 29. Id. at 120. For elaboration on the thesis, see Brenda Cossman & Bruce Ryder, What Is 
Marriage-Like Like? The Irrelevance of Conjugality, 18 CAN. J. FAM. L. 269, 272–75 (2001). 
 30. 1997 Haw. Sess. Laws 383 (codified at HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572C). 
 31. See BEYOND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: A NEW STRATEGIC VISION FOR ALL OUR 
FAMILIES AND RELATIONSHIPS (2006), available at http://www.beyondmarriage.org/Beyond 
Marriage.pdf. 
 32. Id. at 4. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol24/iss1/6
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otherwise legitimate political welfare goals,” suggests a boon to 
freedom from “beyond conjugality” that connects closely to 
foundational texts about political liberty.33 My disagreement here is 
over tactics rather than ends. The Canadian national government 
shelved Beyond Conjugality,34 and to the extent that Beyond Same-
Sex Marriage announces a strategy for overt action, it too appears 
likely to fail.  
Instead this Article endorses diffusion, the path of a peaceful 
guerrilla movement, in the struggle against the placement of marriage 
bans into state constitutions. The guerrilla movement commended 
here hurts no one while doing subversion work more effectively than 
does the unity-and-clarity approach that the non-guerrilla same-sex 
marriage movement seems to prefer. Among single-subject slogan 
messages sent to nonpartisans in the United States, “family values” or 
“traditional marriage” seems to beat what the progressive side thinks 
is its goal: “civil rights,” “marriage equality.” For activists, coming 
together to write enlightened marriage policy reform and announce 
an agenda on websites wins publicity and builds camaraderie, but 
also forms a target for focused conservative reaction, not to say 
homophobic rage. As an alternative—or at least a supplement—to 
this common cause, marriage activists should scatter into different 
corners of law and policy to make marital status of less law-based 
consequence for individuals.35 
Part I of this Article states the task by reviewing the battleground: 
a nation with a large number of anti-marriage state constitutional 
amendments and ongoing efforts to enact more of them. Part II 
details an oppositional strategy. Afflicted with the sunny-side 
 
 33. E-mail from Tamara Metz, Assistant Professor of Political Science and Humanities, 
Reed College, to Anita Bernstein, Wallace Stevens Professor of Law, New York Law School 
(Aug. 29, 2006, 15:16 EST) (on file with author). 
 34. Department of Justice Canada, Marriage and Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Unions, 
http://www.justice.gc.ca/en/dept/pub/mar/2.html# (last visited Apr. 9, 2007) (noting that 
“Beyond Conjugality” was “tabled in Parliament in 2002”). 
 35. One cultural critic has questioned the fight for same-sex marriage with reference to 
this priority: “rather than marriage as prerequisite to access government privileges,” she asks, 
“shouldn’t the fight be to uncouple resource distribution from marital status?” LAURA KIPNIS, 
AGAINST LOVE: A POLEMIC 169 (2003). It should indeed. But activists have to fight this fight 
with care, and work for particular reforms that would treat married people like their unmarried 
counterparts and unmarried people like the married. A comprehensive banner—“Uncouple 
Resource Distribution from Marital Status” writ large—is less likely to fly. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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optimism that law reformers tend to harbor, this Part focuses on 
constructive changes that have already taken shape. The struggle 
against marriage-denying legislation and constitutional changes will 
look falsely bleak if all one contemplates is a map of the fifty states 
with only five rendered in a contrasting color for having staved off 
the blight of DOMA. According to Part II’s cheerful map, even 
crimson Utah has taken some steps in a good direction. 
Developments outside the United States are especially heartening to 
this cause, but the Article remains inside the national border in order 
to better address American reformers—except for its attention to one 
Canadian contribution, Beyond Conjugality.  
I. BATTLE LINES: CURRENT STATE LEGISLATION AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS 
On the first Wednesday of June 2006, the United States Senate 
decisively rejected36 the Federal Marriage Amendment,37 introduced 
in the United States House of Representatives in May 2003 and 
revised slightly in 2004. The Federal Marriage Amendment laid 
down a gauntlet: 
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of 
a man and a woman. Neither this Constitution or the 
constitution of any State, nor state or federal law, shall be 
construed to require that marital status or the legal incidents 
thereof be conferred upon unmarried couples or groups.38 
Several observers enjoyed the result.39 But roll back the calendar 
just a day, to the first Tuesday in June of the same year: the voters of 
one state, just about as resoundingly, approved their own similar 
 
 36. Bennett Roth, Gay Marriage Amendment Falls Short Again in Senate, HOUSTON 
CHRON., June 8, 2006, at A3. 
 37. H.R.J. Res. 56, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 38. Id. § 1. 
 39. See, e.g., Macarena Hernández, Give Gay Marriage Ban a Rest, GOP, DALLAS 
MORNING NEWS, June 9, 2006, at A21 (describing the outcome as a “really pathetic” defeat for 
President Bush); Press Release, Nat’l Org. for Women, NOW Encouraged by Senate Defeat of 
Discriminatory Marriage Amendment (June 8, 2006), available at http://www.now. 
org/press/06-06/06-08.html. 
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constitutional amendment.40 The results in the Senate and in Alabama 
are not nearly of equal magnitude, of course. Even if every state 
changed its constitution to deny this kind of marriage, the decision by 
Congress to reject the plan would keep an amendment from the 
United States Constitution, a document of greater importance than all 
the states’ constitutions heaped together.  
Yet dozens of anti-marriage constitutional amendment results like 
Alabama’s are noteworthy nevertheless. When this Article was going 
to press, the laws of all but five of the nation’s states—
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, and Rhode 
Island—expressly limited marriage to a man and a woman.41 With 
the exception of Massachusetts, marriage licenses are not available to 
same-sex couples in any U.S. jurisdiction.42 Most of these same-sex 
restrictions on marriage were codified during the DOMA era, but a 
handful of states had expressly prohibited marriage between a man 
and a man and a woman and a woman before the passage of 
DOMA.43 One newcomer to the defense-of-marriage list, 
Connecticut, joined the majority in 2005 while providing for same-
sex civil unions44; the civil unions bill also included a DOMA 
amendment, ending Connecticut’s long resistance to the marriage-
restricting trend.45  
Provisions against same-sex marriage vary. Some states use 
standard post-1996 defensive-of-marriage language, declaring this 
legal category to be a unique relationship between a man and a 
woman, asserting a state interest in gender dimorphism, and refusing 
to recognize same-sex marriages solemnized or licensed in another 
jurisdiction.46 Indiana uses terser language: “Only a female may 
marry a male. Only a male may marry a female. . . . A marriage 
between persons of the same gender is void in Indiana even if the 
 
 40. Jill Zuckman, Same-Sex Marriage Ban Fails in Senate, CHI. TRIB., June 8, 2006, at 1 
(reporting Alabama outcome). 
 41. See National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 10. 
 42. Belluck, supra note 19. 
 43. See MD. CODE ANN., Family Law § 2-201 (West 2004); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 457:1 (2004); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-101 (2005). 
 44. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46b–38aa, 38bb (West 2004). 
 45. William Yardley, Connecticut Approves Civil Unions for Gays, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 
2005, at B1. 
 46. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1 (2004); MO. REV. STAT. § 451.022 (2000). 
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marriage is lawful in the place where it is solemnized.”47 Some states 
include the condition of being the same sex as one’s prospective 
spouse, listed next to being the ancestor or the sibling of the 
prospective spouse, as among the disabilities that prevent marriage.48  
As has been noted, the majority of American state constitutions 
declare marriage available only to a man and a woman: voters in 
Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, 
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, 
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, and Washington 
have added provisions in their constitutions that follow much of the 
language of the Federal Marriage Amendment.49 Of this majority, 
approximately sixteen state constitutions contain an additional 
proscription: they now prohibit state and local governments from 
establishing civil unions or partnership benefits that resemble 
marriage for any relationship other than between a man and a 
woman.50 
Almost every time an American state electorate has faced a ballot 
initiative or referendum proposing a yes or no vote on whether a state 
should limit marriage to a man and a woman, it has turned in a 
resounding majority: Voters say “Yes.”51 Poll data diverge from this 
solidity, indicating that Americans are not opposed to same-sex 
 
 47. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-11-1-1(a),(b) (West 2006). 
 48. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 101(a) (1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-
401(1)(d) (2006). 
 49. ALA. CONST. amend. 774; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25; ARK. CONST. amend. 83; 
COLO. CONST. § 31; GA. CONST. art. I, § IV; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23; IDAHO CONST. art. III, 
§ 28; KAN. CONST. art. XV, § 16; LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15; KY. CONST. § 233A; MICH. 
CONST. art. I, § 25; MISS. CONST. art. XIV, § 263A; MO. CONST. art. I, § 33; MONT. CONST. 
art. VIII; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 21; N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 28; OHIO 
CONST. art. XVI, § 11; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 35; OR. CONST. art. XV, § 5a; S.D. CONST. art. 
XXI, § 9; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 32; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 29. 
 50. Estimates are inexact. For one made after the November 2006 election, see HUMAN 
RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, STATE PROHIBITIONS ON MARRIAGE FOR SAME-SEX COUPLE [sic] (2006), 
available at  http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=Home&CONTENTID=28225& 
TEMPLATE=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm (counting Alabama, Arkansas, 
Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Washington as containing constitutional language 
“that does, or may, affect other legal relationships, such as civil unions or domestic 
partnerships”). 
 51. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
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marriage in the same resounding numbers.52 Defense-of-marriage 
ballot initiatives thus appear to draw enemies of same-sex marriage 
disproportionately to the polls.53 Supporters of same-sex marriage 
may be able to reverse this turnout pattern in future contests. To date, 
however, those who would condemn same-sex marriage in state 
constitutions have enjoyed unvarying victory in all state-level 
referenda but one. 
It is easy, of course, to shrug off benighted state constitutions. 
Before they lowered themselves into amendments declaring rules 
about conjugal relationships that formed inside the state or outside its 
boundaries, they were infamous for trivia.54 These little documents 
inspire none of the reverence in which the United States Constitution 
has been wreathed for centuries.  
Though puny in isolation, however, state constitutions gain 
potency wherever they join together to say the same thing. Provisions 
absent in national-level law but found in the majority of state 
constitutions—such as municipal home rule,55 hymns to “open 
courts,”56 free speech rights that are more expansive than what the 
 
 52. “Depends on how you ask,” said ABC News, describing its survey of 1,036 American 
adults in January 2004 compared with the results of earlier surveys. See David Morris & Gary 
Langer, Same-Sex Marriage: Most Oppose It, but Balk at Amending Constitution, 
ABCNEWS.COM, Jan. 21, 2004, http://www.abcnews.go.com/sections/us/Relationships/same_ 
sex_marriage_poll_040121.html. ABC News concluded that approximately 55% of Americans 
appear to oppose same-sex marriage. Id. A 2006 survey found that a majority (54%) of 
Americans favor civil unions. Peter Steinfels, The Combat of America’s “Culture Wars” Takes 
Place Within Political Parties Instead of Between Them, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2006, at A11. 
 53. Peter J. Wallison, A Republican Country, AM. SPECTATOR, Oct. 2005, at 18–23, 
available at http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.foreign,pubID.23301/pub_detail.asp 
(expressing uncertainty on whether this factor tilted the 2004 presidential election, but noting 
that constitutional amendment proposals “brought to the polls large numbers of fundamentalist 
Christians and evangelicals who voted for President Bush and might otherwise have stayed 
home”). 
 54. James Gardner has pressed this point extensively. See, e.g., James A. Gardner, Reply: 
What Is a State Constitution?, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 1025, 1027 (1993); James A. Gardner, The 
Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 761 (1992). 
 55. See Chad Lamer, Why Government Policies Encourage Urban Sprawl and the 
Alternatives Offered by New Urbanism, 13 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 391, 392 (2004) 
(explaining the “municipal home rule” that “allows local governments to enact ordinances 
‘without [specific] statutory authority’ from the state”) (alteration in original). 
 56. See Carol Rice Andrews, A Right of Access to Court Under the Petition Clause of the 
First Amendment, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 557, 560–61 n.12 (1999). 
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First Amendment provides,57 and limits on how much debt a state can 
take on58—enjoy hefty authority.59 This “motherhood” aura around 
precepts expressed in state constitutions may stem from a real 
consensus that underlies them, rather than any particular imprint 
attributable to constitutionalization. Alternatively, the provisions’ 
presence in constitutions might also increase, not just bespeak, their 
base of public support.  
Even if the widespread constitutionalization of antipathy to same-
sex marriage does not worsen tangibly the hardships of life for 
anyone, or make a federal amendment more likely, supporters of 
same-sex marriage ought to care about the civic lives of persons 
whose home-state constitutions denigrate same-sex relationships. 
These supporters should try to subvert through lawful means any 
state law—especially a constitutional provision—that demotes 
lesbian and gay male citizens to a second-class tier when they form 
couples. Anyone concerned about civil rights ought to resist the de 
jure oppression of a minority whose existence threatens no one and 
that has long suffered from invidious discrimination.  
II. A DIFFERENT OPPOSITIONAL STRATEGY 
Experiences from marriage-policy reform in the United States 
(with a little help from Canada) form a new pattern against the 
endeavor to ban same-sex marriage in the United States. The first 
section in this Part dusts off the 2001 Beyond Conjugality report of 
the Ministry of Justice in Canada. Because the Canadian government 
 
 57. See Evan G.S. Siegel, Comment, Closing the Campus Gates to Free Expression: The 
Regulation of Offensive Speech at Colleges and Universities, 39 EMORY L.J. 1351, 1396 
(1990). 
 58. See Richard Briffault, Foreword: The Disfavored Constitution: State Fiscal Limits 
and State Constitutional Law, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 907, 911–12 (2003). 
 59. When they can, commentators advocating for a particular shift in national policy 
invoke the embrace of their chosen position in a large number of state constitutions. See, e.g., 
Mark Neil Aaronson, Ideas Matter: A Review of John Denvir’s Democracy’s Constitution, 36 
U.S.F. L. REV. 937, 966 (2002) (finding support for increased social rights in a provision, 
located in two-thirds of the state constitutions, that endorses the pursuit of happiness); William 
D. Araiza, Democracy, Distrust, and the Public Trust: Process-Based Constitutional Theory, 
the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Search for a Substantive Environmental Value, 45 UCLA L. 
REV. 385, 439 (1997) (using widespread state constitutionalization to support increased 
environmental protection). 
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never acted overtly to implement its recommendations, Beyond 
Conjugality may seem inert. It is no such thing, but it needs to be 
reread. The second section looks at the most explicit example of legal 
reform in the United States that effects the recommendations of this 
Article: the reciprocal beneficiaries provision of Hawaii and its 
sequellae, a handful of near-imitators. Hawaii’s creation of a new 
status refutes any misgiving an activist might have about the 
impossibility of obtaining meaningful beyond-conjugality reform at 
the state level.  
The third section of this Part builds on the first two. Beyond 
Conjugality gives a blueprint; new legal labels show the possibility of 
congenial state legislation. The next question for opponents of an 
anti-marriage amendment becomes “What is possible?” Accordingly, 
I survey various statutes and other legal developments, most of them 
relatively recent, that help to subvert the marriage-amendment 
crusade with policy reform. Like Molière’s bourgeois gentleman who 
learned he had been speaking in prose while asking for his slippers 
and a nightcap,60 these subversives do their work incidentally, along 
with their focus on other goals. 
 
 60. MOLIÈRE, LE BOURGEOIS GENTILHOMME act 2, sc. 4. 
MONSIEUR JOURDAIN 
Quoi? Quand je dis: “Nicole, 
apportez- moi mes pantoufles, et me 
donnez mon bonnet de nuit,” c’est de 
la prose? 
PHILOSOPHY MASTER 
Oui, monsieur. 
MONSIEUR JOURDAIN 
Par ma foi! Il y a plus de quarante ans 
que je dis de la prose sans que j’en 
susse rien, et je vous suis le plus 
oblige du monde de m’avoir appris 
cela. 
MONSIEUR JOURDAIN 
Oh, really, so when I say: 
“Nicole, bring me my slippers 
and fetch my nightcap,” is that 
prose? 
PHILOSOPHY MASTER 
Most clearly. 
MONSIEUR JOURDAIN 
Well, what do you know about 
that! These forty years now, I’ve 
been speaking in prose without 
knowing it! How grateful am I to 
you for teaching me that! 
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A. The Blueprint: Beyond Conjugality 
1. The Diminution of Conjugality Described 
The Law Commission of Canada began its report with the 
declaration that adult relationships take many forms, and are not 
limited to the marriage of one man and one woman.61 This statement 
appeared to be aimed at the Canadian controversy over same-sex 
marriage that was bubbling in late 2001. A year earlier, the House of 
Commons had enacted a DOMA-like federal definition in a 
resolution, calling marriage “the union of one man and one woman to 
the exclusion of all others,”62 but the Supreme Court of Canada had 
also held in 1999 that same-sex couples were entitled to many of the 
benefits of marriage.63  
As rhetoric, the bland reference to diversity sounded like an 
endorsement of same-sex marriage, or perhaps an extension of a set 
of lesser privileges to same-sex couples.64 But the title of the report 
bespoke another direction. Diversity of close personal relationships 
among adults, said the Law Commission, went well beyond similarity 
versus difference in the adults’ reproductive anatomy.65 The 
Commission gave adult siblings living together and disabled adults 
with their caregivers as two examples of close relationships that, 
though nonconjugal, resemble in pertinent ways the families that 
originate in sexual affiliation.66 
Today, across the border, matrimonial conjugality remains a 
popular but far from universal way for adults to live.67 In 2005 a 
 
 61. BEYOND CONJUGALITY, supra note 27, at 1. 
 62. 240 PARL. DEB., H.C. (1999) 1020, 1020-2255, available at http://www2.parl.gc.ca/ 
HousePublications.aspx?Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=36&Ses=1&DocId=2332947. In 
Canada, marriage law is located substantively at the province level, although the federal 
government defines status. 
 63. M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3 (Can.). A leading Canadian court, the Ontario Court of 
Appeals, would go on in 2003 to hold that the withholding of marriage from same-sex couples 
violated the Canadian constitution. Halpern v. Canada, [2003] 65 O.R. (3d) 161. 
 64. BEYOND CONJUGALITY, supra note 27, at 32. 
 65. Id.  
 66. Id.  
 67. Kate Zernicke, Why Are There So Many Single Americans?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 
2007, § 4, at 1 (noting that only about half of adult men and women in the United States are 
now living with a spouse). 
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survey under the auspices of the Census Bureau looked at three 
million households in the United States and found that for the first 
time unmarried, rather than married, adults headed the majority of 
households.68 The majority was tiny—50.3% versus 49.7%—but 
telling, and the decline of married-headed households has proceeded 
without reversal since 1950.69 In 2006 the National Marriage Project 
reported a decline of 50% in the number of new marriages 
commenced per one thousand unmarried adult women from 1970 to 
2004,70 a datum consistent with a report from this group five years 
earlier that 45% of young adults believe that the government should 
not be involved in licensing marriage.71 While conjugality remains a 
potent bond in the United States (the National Marriage Project 
findings suggest that many individuals who have retreated from 
marriage choose non-marital cohabitation as couples72), it takes a 
weaker form outside of licenses and ceremonies. Cohabitants feel 
freer than spouses to leave.73 
2. The Diminution of Conjugality Prescribed 
Beyond Conjugality shares themes with commentary suggesting 
that attention to sexual affiliation by the state as a basis for its 
categories of “marriage” and “family” may be obsolete.74 In past eras, 
 
 68. Thomas F. Coleman, Unmarried Households in the United States, UNMARRIED AM., 
Aug. 15, 2006, available at http://www.unmarriedamerica.org/Census_1990-2001/unmarried-
majority-table.htm (reporting Census data). 
 69. Thomas F. Coleman, Drum Roll: New ‘Unmarried Majority’ Takes Center Stage, 
UNMARRIED AM., Aug. 21, 2006, http://www.unmarriedamerica.org/column-one/8-21-06- 
census-release-on-unmarried-majority.htm. 
 70. NAT’L MARRIAGE PROJECT, THE STATE OF OUR UNIONS 16 (2006) [hereinafter 
UNIONS 2006], available at http://marriage.rutgers.edu/Publications/SOOU/SOOU2006.pdf. 
 71. See Anita Bernstein, For and Against Marriage: A Revision, 102 MICH. L. REV. 129, 
138 n.27 (2003) (citing NAT’L MARRIAGE PROJECT, supra note 70). 
 72. UNIONS 2006, supra note 70, at 19. 
 73. Steven L. Nock, A Comparison of Marriage and Cohabiting Relationships, 16 J. FAM. 
ISSUES 53, 56 (1995) (observing that marriage holds people together in various ways that differ 
from simple cohabitation, including the difficulty of fulfilling exit formalities and worries about 
having to comply with closer external oversight of one’s relations with one’s children). 
 74. Laurence Drew Borten, Note, Sex, Procreation, and the State Interest in Marriage, 
102 COLUM. L. REV. 1089 (2002); see also Bernstein, supra note 71, at 135–36 nn.19, 20 
(citing various writers who advocate the abolition of marriage as a legal status, notably Martha 
Fineman). 
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sexual intercourse—a force that can defy the wishes of participants to 
forestall or postpone the making of children—would often (and still 
sometimes does) generate a baby not reliably connected to any 
particular person as its father. This infant, along with one or both of 
its parents, cries out figuratively for state-enforced channeling and 
regulation of who forms the child, and so the connection of female 
and male bodies has led to a fundamental legal understanding of what 
makes a family.75 
Technological developments have challenged that understanding. 
Contraception has become more available and reliable: today, 
supported to some faint degree by a nominal constitutional right to 
early abortion, this change has made parenthood more of a voluntary 
undertaking and less of a vulnerability that threatens to isolate and 
impoverish new mothers and their children as a wages-of-sin 
punishment for sexual agency. The state can also cheaply and 
accurately determine whether a putative father begot a child, reducing 
the need to ascribe a legal label of “husband” on the way to 
identifying a father.76 With these venerable concerns about the 
welfare of children and parents now eased, continuing to ascribe legal 
consequences to sexual affiliation may make less sense. At least it 
requires attention from the state. 
The authors of Beyond Conjugality attempted to furnish this 
attention by looking at the reasons that states care about relationships. 
The vulnerability of children seems undeniable, as does the 
correctness (at least most of the time) of assigning caregiving to their 
parents. Linking children legally to their parents called for no law 
 
 75. In its decision refusing to extend same-sex marriage, the New York Court of Appeals 
curiously revived this rationale as a justification for restricting marriage to opposite-sex 
couples. See Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006). 
 76. My colleague Jeff Pennell has observed in conversation that the catchphrase 
‘mommy’s babies, daddy’s maybes’ has been inverted by technology: Men cannot hide from 
the DNA test that produces a binary yes-no result, whereas a woman can gain a claim to 
biological parenthood either by furnishing a gamete, as a man does, or by gestation; giving birth 
will not always make one a (unitary) mother comparable to the way that all persons are deemed 
to have only one biological father. Daddy’s babies, mommy’s maybes. For one instance of the 
difficulties that follow, see Judith Berck, Easing a Parent’s Anxiety: Jewish by Nature or 
Nurture?, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2006, at B5 (noting that Orthodox Jews frequently put infants 
formed by anonymous egg donation and born to Jewish gestational mothers through a 
conversion ceremony, as a better-safe-than-sorry precaution reflecting the uncertain religious 
identity of the child, notwithstanding the rule that Jewish identity descends through the mother). 
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reform efforts. Relationships among adults, however, may or may not 
be the province of the state. 
From this premise, the Law Commission proposed that when 
relationships “do not actually matter” to a governmental objective, 
the government should not take note of them.77 As the Commission 
elaborated, such a change would promote the values of equality and 
autonomy: equality, because similarly situated persons would be 
treated alike; autonomy because the state would refrain from 
meddling with an individual’s decision to form or abandon a 
relationship.78  
Relationships are of interest to the state, the Commission 
continued, only because of their “functional attributes.”79 The two 
main functional attributes are “emotional intimacy and economic 
interdependency,” although a third, “a shared residence,” might be 
relevant too.80 In some settings where relationships matter, the state 
might choose to establish a voluntary registration scheme; in others, 
ascription of a law-based relation, even perhaps over the objection of 
one partner, might be in order. But conjugality—a connection related 
to the ongoing or presumed past contact between the genitals of two 
adults—is none of the state’s business: “The existence of sexual 
relations within a relationship . . . is not relevant to legitimate state 
objectives.”81 
3. Applications for Subversives 
Years after the Canadian federal government politely pushed 
Beyond Conjugality off the policy table without responding to its 
rationalist challenge,82 little cogent defending of conjugality as a 
 
 77. Id. at 31. Following this premise, the Law Commission proposed revision of Canadian 
rules of evidence in criminal trials. Id.; see also id. at 55 (detailing a proposed new law of the 
marital communications privilege). 
 78. Id. at 13. 
 79. Id. at 36. 
 80. Id. at 34. 
 81. Id.  
 82. The only response available to the public appears in a Ministry of Justice report 
published the following year, which suggested that the recommendation to Canadian 
governments to stop using conjugality as a criterion for distributing obligations and benefits 
may have been premature. See Department of Justice Canada, supra note 34, at n.4 (claiming 
that “further study would be needed before Parliament can decide whether it is appropriate to 
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subject of legitimate state interest has emerged,83 suggesting that the 
Law Commission may have offered compelling content in a weak 
medium or package. What might have been weak about the white-
paper medium? Numerous confounding variables impede the search 
for a diagnosis. A hint appears, however, in the 2002 report that 
included a short obituary for Beyond Conjugality.84 The Ministry of 
Justice of Canada, having made short work of the Law Commission 
thesis, went on to relate a host of legal changes in almost every 
province, even conservative Alberta, that extended governmental 
recognition of same-sex relationships.85 Canadian law has not 
abandoned conjugality, but has shown some willingness to accept 
Beyond Conjugality writ small. Hence my hypothesis: Sweeping, 
comprehensive reexaminations of marriage might induce panic in 
voters and agents of governments. Modest, incremental changes (in 
Canada, mild endorsement of same-sex pairing has for some time 
been mainstream, rather than left of center) appear easier to enact. 
In the balance of this Part, accordingly, I look for plurals rather 
than a singular. Beyond Conjugality offers no solitary application or 
lesson—only applications. Similarly, the next section of this Part 
considers implementations plural rather than any one implementation 
of a law and policy shift that would reduce state attention to 
conjugality and marriage. Consistent with this theme of diffusion, the 
final section moves away from state governments to look at what 
other innovators are achieving, most of them without knowing it, to 
subvert the defense-of-marriage crusade. 
 
treat non-conjugal relationships in the same way as spouses or common-law partners in all 
federal laws”). 
 83. Canadian marriage scholar Daniel Cere has taken on the task. See generally CTR. FOR 
MARRIAGE & FAMILIES, THE FUTURE OF FAMILY LAW: LAW AND THE MARRIAGE CRISIS IN 
NORTH AMERICA (2005); DANIEL CERE, REDEFINING MARRIAGE: A CASE FOR CAUTION 
(2003), available at http://www.voteonmarriage.org/Cere-Redifining%20Marriage%20-%20A 
%20case%20for%20Caution.pdf. Other writers offer less sweeping defenses of conjugality as 
an area of state concern. For example, Marsha Garrison does not take on conjugality directly, 
but argues that marriage is different from other unions that feature “relational intimacy or 
economic interdependency” in that a married couple has exchanged public vows. Marsha 
Garrison, Is Consent Necessary? An Evaluation of the Emerging Law of Cohabitant Obligation, 
52 UCLA L. REV. 815, 824–25 (2005). 
 84. See Department of Justice Canada, supra note 34. 
 85. Id.  
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B. Examples of Subversive Implementations by  
United States Governments 
In numerous instances both federal and state governments have 
enacted policies that deny or abrogate conjugality in the furnishing of 
social-welfare benefits to citizens. This section gathers some 
examples of these divergent legal categories. The coexistence of 
formal marriage with a host of rival categories that often do not 
demand conjugality—including non-marital households, non-marital 
dependents, civil unions, domestic partnerships (the public and 
private kind, in various iterations), reciprocal beneficiaries, adult 
designees, and common law spouses—makes one wonder what 
exactly the self-appointed defenders defend. The label of Marriage 
looms over government policy like a balloon still vividly painted but 
leaking air. As the illustrations below indicate, governments can 
subvert the defense-of-marriage crusade without intending to do so, 
and subversive maneuvers predate the vintage-1996 crusade.  
1. Food Stamps and the “Household Concept” 
When the United States government started a comprehensive 
national food stamp program as part of the Great Society domestic 
policy shift of the 1960s,86 Congress announced its desire to improve 
the lot of “low-income households.”87 “Eligibility for participation in 
the program,” as Justice Brennan later wrote in United States 
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, “is determined on a household 
rather than an individual basis.”88 It fell to the Department of 
Agriculture to say what a household was and, for food-stamps 
purposes, the Code of Federal Regulations contains a section headed 
“Household concept.”89  
 
 86. For an overview, see United States Department of Agriculture: About Food Stamps, 
http://www.fns.usda.gov/fsp/about_fsp.htm (last visited May 9, 2007). 
 87. 7 U.S.C. § 2011 (2000) (“It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress, in order to 
promote the general welfare, to safeguard the health and well-being of the Nation’s population 
by raising levels of nutrition among low-income households.”). 
 88. 413 U.S. 528, 529 (1973). 
 89. 7 C.F.R. § 273.1 (2006). 
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The household concept, as rendered here, does not require a 
marriage. It pays heed to marital status only in its provision that 
spouses who live together must be considered members of the same 
household.90 Instead of marriage, it speaks of the home and “home 
consumption” of meals, implying unity independent of 
matrimony91—and evoking the functional version of togetherness 
advanced in Beyond Conjugality.92 
In another forward-looking take on the household, the Department 
of Agriculture regulations offer an anti-patriarchal twist on who 
heads it. On one hand, “household concept” regulations cling to the 
traditional requirement that each household must be headed,93 and for 
some situations “the head of household shall be the principal wage 
earner.”94 So far, the low-income household in the Code of Federal 
Regulations resembles the Victorian middle-class hearth. On the 
other hand, however, a household that receives food stamps enjoys a 
privilege unavailable to most American households: for most 
purposes, it can choose its own head.95 Here the rules give an 
alternative-family scheme containing rich hints of deliberation, 
consensus, and a voice for all resident members. 
The range of households presented here is of interest beyond the 
simple need of poor people to obtain better physical nourishment 
through government intervention. A skeptic might argue that putative 
households (or individuals insisting they do not live in households) 
who seek this government benefit are just packages that legal services 
lawyers arrange instrumentally, to put more food on the table for their 
clients. Sometimes, as was the case in Moreno, poor adults gain an 
 
 90. See id. § 273.1(b)(1). 
 91. Id. § 273.1(a)(3). 
 92. Also suggestive of this functional approach is Zayas v. Department of Health and 
Rehabilitative Services, 598 So. 2d 257 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992), which involved a twenty-
five-year-old, “totally disabled” woman who lived with her parents, yet maintained what the 
court deemed a separate household: “Although Ms. Zayas resides in the same home as her 
parents, she lives a separate life from them—financially, socially and otherwise. Ms. Zayas and 
her parents do not live together as one economic or social unit.” Id. at 258. In this reading, the 
Zayas family—made up of concerned, caregiving mother and father and relatively young, 
vulnerable daughter—became individuals rather than one unitary legal-economic unit. 
 93. 7 C.F.R. § 273.1(d). 
 94. Id. § 273.1(d)(2). 
 95. Id. § 273.1(d)(1). 
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advantage when they huddle together as one household96; at other 
times poor adults living together do better when designated as 
individuals.97 In this view the extensive variations considered in the 
Code of Federal Regulations depict only strategies in the welfare 
game and signal no real diversity in the ways people can form a 
family.  
Strategies, however, are not necessarily insignificant. Because so 
much of the defense-of-marriage crusade wages its fight over a label, 
and injures people in this fight, labels do matter. Food stamp 
regulations and the ensuing case law over how to classify groupings 
of individuals teach Americans that households—or, in a near-
synonym, families—can form in varying permutations, with or 
without the consent of their members (as evidenced by litigation 
protesting the denial of food stamps based on the ascription of a 
household status), headed by either the one whom householders elect 
as their head or the person that a state government chooses, and 
marked by the same economic and emotional interdependency that 
Beyond Conjugality found dispositive. With the “household concept” 
so malleable, the boundaries of marriage also might be crumbling 
into functionality.  
2. Dependents as Recognized by the Internal Revenue Code 
In another federal law reference to the household, taxpayers can 
receive legal recognition of their families through the status of 
“dependent.”98 Federal tax law identifies dependents as either 
qualified children or qualified relatives.99 This recognition appears 
less than subversive at first, but the statute goes on to find that not 
only the taxpayer’s brother, stepfather, daughter-in-law, and so on 
will have enough of a “relationship” to the taxpayer100; equally 
 
 96. The Court agreed with these claimants and held that the Moreno households were 
eligible to receive food stamps. See U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 538 (1973). 
 97. See Robinson v. Block, 869 F.2d 202 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that siblings living 
together have the burden of proof to establish their separate, non-household status); see also 
Siegel, supra note 57, at 1396–98 (discussing another case where the claimants preferred to be 
cast as individuals). 
 98. 26 U.S.C. § 152(a) (2000). 
 99. Id.  
 100. Id. § 152(d).  
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favored is “[a]n individual . . . who, for the taxable year of the 
taxpayer, has the same principal place of abode as the taxpayer and is 
a member of the taxpayer’s household.”101 A dependent must have 
income below a stipulated exemption amount, and the taxpayer must 
provide more than half of this person’s financial support.102 No 
conjugality needed. One crucial benefit of this status is that the 
furnishing of workplace-based health insurance to the dependent does 
not generate taxable income.103 
The annals of condoned dependents over the decades include a 
taxpayer’s vulnerable sister,104 the father of the taxpayer’s common 
law wife,105 and the children of the taxpayer’s opposite-sex, live-in 
companion.106 Researchers have not counted how many same-sex 
sexual partners have been so designated on tax returns. Undoubtedly 
this designation has enjoyed some favor among the cohort,107 even if 
“few same-sex spouses or domestic partners qualify as . . . 
dependent[s] for federal income tax purposes.”108 Whether frequently 
or infrequently chosen by same-sex couples, however, the federal tax 
category of dependent lends indirect support to this civil rights quest. 
By focusing on dependency and a shared household rather than 
 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. § 152(d)(2)(H). 
 103. Frank S. Berall, Tax Consequences of Unmarried Cohabitation, 23 QUINNIPIAC L. 
REV. 395, 401 (2004). On the importance of access to workplace-based health insurance, see 
infra notes 197–201 and accompanying text. 
 104. Miller v. Glenn, 47 F. Supp. 794, 795 (W.D. Ky. 1942). 
 105. Ross v. Commissioner, TC Memo 1972-122 (1972). 
 106. See Toni Robinson & Mary Moers Wenig, Marry in Haste, Repent at Tax Time: 
Marital Status as a Tax Determinant, 8 VA. TAX REV. 773, 831 n.254 (1989) (citing cases). 
 107. For whatever one anecdote may be worth: a same-sex couple of my acquaintance 
(high-income professionals most of the time) once discussed becoming taxpayer and dependent 
during an aberrant year of income inequality. Before the Supreme Court struck them down, 
sodomy statutes posed a potential obstacle to the dependent route for same-sex couples, as this 
status used to be denied to people in relationships “in violation of local law.” See 26 U.S.C. 
§ 152(b)(5) (2000) (repealed in 2004). Although the public record includes no denial of 
dependency status on this basis, the Internal Revenue Service used to refer to this provision in 
its private letter rulings regarding domestic partnerships. Nancy J. Knauer, Heteronormativity 
and Tax Policy, 101 W. VA. L. REV. 129, 180 (1998). 
 108. Janice Kay McClendon, A Small Step Forward in the Last Civil Rights Battle: 
Extending Benefits Under Federally Regulated Employee Benefit Plans to Same-Sex Couples, 
36 N.M. L. REV. 99, 110 (2006). McClendon adds that generally “same-sex households are 
dual income households.” Id. at 111. 
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sexual affiliation, the Internal Revenue Code has taken public welfare 
policy beyond conjugality. 
3. Labels for Nonconjugal Intimates in State and Local Law 
The most famed legal label formed for beyond-conjugality 
coupledom is “reciprocal beneficiary,” inaugurated in Hawaii in 1997 
following the publication of a report from the state Commission on 
Sexual Orientation and the Law.109 After surveying the state-
sponsored advantages of being married and then considering 
alternatives to marriage that included “comprehensive” and “limited” 
domestic partnerships, the report concluded that extending marriage 
to same-sex couples would be the best way to remove legal 
disabilities that the report attributed to discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation.110 The state went on to reject the recommendation 
through a constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage, but 
its legislature retained awareness of the numerous benefits that the 
commission had associated with this legal status, and, in 1997, 
Hawaii extended many of these benefits to registered reciprocal 
beneficiaries.111 To become reciprocal beneficiaries under Hawaii 
law, two adult individuals must be prohibited from marrying each 
other (because they are of the same sex or already related) and not 
already married to anyone else.112 They attain their status by 
registering with the state Vital Records Office.113  
These criteria are extraordinarily liberal. A couple need not have 
any connection to Hawaii, nor resemble an opposite-sex married 
couple in any way, beyond being two-and-only-two people. As 
reciprocal beneficiaries, the couple when in Hawaii enjoys 
 
 109. STATE OF HAW., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON SEXUALITY AND THE LAW (1995), 
available at http://www.state.hi.us/lrb/rpts95/sol/. 
 110. See id. chs. 3 & 4. The Hawaii Supreme Court held that denying marriage to same-sex 
couples violated the equal protection provision of the state constitution. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 
P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). 
 111. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 572C-1 to 572C-7 (2005). 
 112. Id. § 572C-4. Hawaiian law has not yet resolved the question of whether two 
individuals of the same sex who married in Massachusetts (or a foreign jurisdiction that 
recognizes same-sex marriage) can be reciprocal beneficiaries, nor whether such a couple 
applying for this status in Hawaii would have to declare themselves not married to each other. 
 113. Id. § 572C-5. 
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survivorship rights (for worker’s compensation and state retirement 
benefits as well as inheritance), tenancy by the entirety, hospital 
visitation, automobile insurance coverage, family and bereavement 
leave, standing to bring wrongful death lawsuits, and a host of small 
miscellaneous benefits.114  
When Vermont enacted civil unions in response to its state 
supreme court’s directive to extend a marriage-like status to same-sex 
couples, the legislature provided in the same statute for a reciprocal 
beneficiary status, albeit a less expansive one.115 Reciprocal 
beneficiaries in Vermont must be ineligible for marriage and civil 
unions, and must be “related by blood or by adoption.”116 The 
benefits list is abbreviated: reciprocal beneficiaries gain privileges 
that are confined mainly to medical care.117 
The government of Salt Lake City recognizes “adult designees” of 
city workers, and offers them health insurance based on municipal 
employment. Neither the state’s constitutional amendment barring 
same-sex marriage nor its DOMA legislation impedes the delivery of 
these benefits to a same-sex partner.118 But the range of “adult 
designees” goes beyond couples. A story in the Deseret News 
summarizes the beyond-conjugality breadth of this label in Salt Lake 
City: 
An adult designee is defined as anyone over age 18 who has 
lived in the city worker’s household for a year and is either 
financially dependent upon the city worker, or has financial 
interdependence with that person. An “adult designee” could 
 
 114. The Hawaii Family Forum, an anti-marriage organization, provides a more extended 
version of this summary. HAW. FAMILY FORUM, DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS, RECIPROCAL 
BENEFICIARIES: WHAT’S IT ALL ABOUT? (n.d.), http://www.hawaiifamilyforum.org/issues/ 
documents/MicrosoftWord-RBS.pdf. Not all observers are pleased with this menu. See Partners 
Task Force for Gay & Lesbian Couples, Marrying Apartheid: The Failure of Domestic 
Partnership Status (2006), http://www.buddybuddy.com/mar-apar.html (last visited May 9, 
2007) (calling the benefits of the statute “modest” and noting its failure to deliver the benefit its 
sponsors touted most, workplace insurance, after the state attorney general decided to invalidate 
that provision). 
 115. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1301–1306 (2002). 
 116. Id. § 1303(3). 
 117. Id. § 1301(a). 
 118. A Utah court so held. In re Utah State Ret. Bd., No. 050916879 (Utah Dist. Ct. 2006), 
available at http://www.acluutah.org/normanruling.pdf. 
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be a sister or brother, a parent, a romantic partner or friend. 
The ordinance also applies to the designee’s children.119 
Taken together, adult designees in Salt Lake City and reciprocal 
beneficiaries in Hawaii show the beyond-conjugality possibilities that 
these legal labels can achieve. In Salt Lake City, an adult designee 
can receive workplace-based health insurance, a crucial benefit of the 
marriage-like status.120 Hawaii withholds this key boon but offers 
much: easy registration requirements to win the label, few qualifying 
criteria, and a range of privileges. Both Hawaii and Salt Lake City 
decline to ask even implicitly about the sexual lives of applicants and 
focus instead on “reciprocal” relationships and interdependence, both 
of which, to these governments, signal the presence of a family. 
4. Domestic Partnerships and Civil Unions 
As anyone reading this far already knows, a few states have 
subverted the marriage-amendment crusade by extending formal 
recognition to same-sex couples. The scorecard as of 2007 includes 
several recognitions, none of which joined the law books during the 
previous year of anti-recognition.121 A man may marry a man and a 
woman may marry a woman in Massachusetts.122 In Vermont and 
Connecticut, a woman-and-woman or man-and-man conjugal pair 
may obtain legal recognition of their relationship in the form of a 
civil union.123 In California, Maine, and New Jersey, same-sex 
couples may form domestic partnerships.124 It is likely that civil 
unions and domestic partnerships will gain a stronger hold in the 
 
 119. Linda Thomson, S.L. Can Offer Benefits to More Than Spouses, DESERET MORNING 
NEWS (Salt Lake City, Utah), May 13, 2006, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/ 
mi_qn4188/is_20060513/ai_n16369634/pg_1. 
 120. See Bernstein, supra note 71, at 179–80 (asserting that the superior health married 
women enjoy in comparison to single women can be explained entirely by married women’s 
being “married to health insurance”). 
 121. See supra Part I. 
 122. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 207 §§ 1–8, 14–17 (2004); see Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. 
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 123. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46b-38aa, 38bb (2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201 et 
seq. (2002). 
 124. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (West 2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2319-A (Supp. 
2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:8A-4 (West Supp. 2006). 
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future; a majority of the American public now favors them,125 and 
coexistence of civil union or domestic partnership provisions with 
DOMA laws in four of these states suggests that only the most severe 
bans, the kind that withhold recognition of any paired status, can 
block these two ways to recognize same-sex couples. 
Supporters of same-sex marriage have mixed (at best) feelings 
about civil unions and domestic partnerships as consolation prizes in 
the marriage struggle. They have expounded on their dissatisfaction 
in numerous writings.126 Here, rather than defend or attack these two 
lesser measures, I distinguish them from each other for purposes of 
subverting the defense-of-marriage crusade.  
As a way to extend relationship recognition to same-sex couples 
at the state level, civil unions are the older of the two measures. They 
began in Vermont, where the state supreme court in 1999 invoked the 
Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont constitution when it 
ordered the legislature to extend the benefits of marriage to same-sex 
couples.127 In response to this decision, the legislature had to choose 
between obeying the court (that is, extending either marriage or the 
privileges of marriage to same-sex couples) or beginning to enact a 
new constitutional amendment that would remove marriage from the 
Common Benefits Clause, a process that would have taken four 
years—during which time the state would have to recognize marriage 
for same-sex couples.128  
The court pushed tiny Vermont down a lonely path in 1999. A 
majority of states had enacted their own DOMA laws when the 
Vermont Supreme Court issued its decision, and no state had 
 
 125. See supra note 52; see also Tonja Jacobi, Sharing the Love: The Political Power of 
Remedial Delay in Same Sex Marriage Cases, 15 LAW & SEXUALITY 11, 42–43 (2006) 
(reporting poll data circa 2004 indicating that 21% of respondents supported same-sex marriage 
and 32% supported civil unions). 
 126. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Equality Practice: Liberal Reflections on the 
Jurisprudence of Civil Unions, 64 ALB. L. REV. 853 (2001) (using liberal political theory to 
deem civil unions a failure); Andrew Sullivan, State of the Union: Why “Civil Union” Isn’t 
Marriage, NEW REPUBLIC (Wash., D.C.), May 8, 2000, at 18 (insisting that civil unions are 
inferior, not equivalent, to marriage); Partners Task Force for Gay & Lesbian Couples, supra 
note 114 (invoking “apartheid” to describe civil unions). 
 127. Lee Banville, The Battle Over Same-Sex Marriage: Vermont’s Civil Unions, PBS 
ONLINE NEWS HOUR, Apr. 30, 2004, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law/gay_marriage/ 
vermont.html. 
 128. Id. 
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purported to extend the benefits of marriage to same-sex couples. 
Rather than defy the supreme court, the Vermont legislature opted to 
write a civil union statute, which took effect in 2000. The Democrats 
lost the state senate that fall, the governor, Howard Dean, professed 
to be severely shaken by his decision to sign the new law,129 and 
opinion polls circa 2000 reported that a majority of state residents 
opposed any legal recognition for same-sex couples.130 Mild though 
they may look today, in sum, Vermont’s civil unions were a big deal 
at the time they were enacted.  
The domestic partnership alternative route has never attracted 
much attention or flak. Unlike civil unions—that is, marriage for 
same-sex couples in all but name—whose legal status is relatively 
clear, domestic partnerships can bestow much or little. There is no 
unitary definition of the term. Civil unions become available to 
couples only by state legislative action, but private employers and 
local units like municipalities as well as state governments can 
recognize domestic partnerships.131 Not only same-sex couples sign 
up for the classification: In some cities and corporate human 
resources departments, opposite-sex couples who want recognition of 
their relationship but do not wish to marry can register as domestic 
partners.132 California and New Jersey divide their unmarried 
opposite-sex resident couples into two categories: those under the age 
of 62, who may not become state-registered domestic partners, and 
those over 62, who may.133 In the District of Columbia, blood 
relatives may register as domestic partners, an option unavailable in 
the states that recognize this status.134 A law review comment titled 
Mimicking Marriage relates frustration over these divergences: “The 
 
 129. Id.  
 130. MICHAEL MELLO, LEGALIZING GAY MARRIAGE 20 (2004). 
 131. Joanna Grossman, The New Jersey Domestic Partnership Law, FINDLAW’S WRIT, Jan. 
13, 2004, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20040113.html (noting that “[a]t least seventy 
municipalities” and “thousands of employers” recognize this status). 
 132. Erin Stefanec, Comment, Mimicking Marriage: As the Evolution of the Legal 
Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage Progresses, Civil Unions Currently Represent the Best 
Alternative to Marriage, 30 U. DAYTON L. REV. 119, 133–35 (2004). 
 133. Thomas F. Coleman, Looking ‘Beyond Marriage’ for Equal Rights, UNMARRIED 
AMERICA, Aug. 7, 2006, http://www.unmarriedamerica.org/column-one/8-7-06-family-rights. 
htm. 
 134. Id.  
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inconsistency among various jurisdictions and private entities 
generates unpredictability that is, perhaps, the greatest disadvantage 
of domestic partnerships.”135 
Inconsistency could indeed be “the greatest disadvantage” for 
activists who pursue “mimicking marriage” and seek the defeat of 
“unpredictability.” Civil unions imitate marriage more closely than 
do the more varied manifestations present under the domestic 
partnership rubric.136 But mimicry per se is not worth chasing;137 and 
as for predictability, whenever a measure comes before American 
judges, legislatures, and voters purporting to extend recognition to 
same-sex relationships, the safest (if most dispiriting) prediction is 
that it will induce or manifest a homophobic response. Recognition 
measures tend to lose when taking forms that extend marriage-like 
benefits to same-sex couples, and tend to win when taking restrictive, 
rights-denying forms.138  
In this battleground, the “disadvantage” of “unpredictability,” or 
insufficient resemblance to real marriage—or what one might call 
bad marriage-mimicry—becomes a stealth advantage. Observers who 
disagree on the issue of granting to same-sex couples legal parity 
with opposite-sex couples agree that for those same-sexers who seek 
substantive rights and privileges rather than “marriage mimicry,” 
definable as the highest-ranked label short of marriage, domestic 
partnership as practiced by the state government in California serves 
 
 135. Stefanec, supra note 132, at 134. 
 136. See Greg Johnson, Vermont Civil Unions: The New Language of Marriage, 25 VT. L. 
REV. 15, 43 (2000). 
There is another more intangible way in which civil unions differ from domestic 
partnerships. To me the term “civil union” is more dignified than “domestic 
partnership.” Domestic partnership has the feel of a business relationship. It is very 
unromantic. Civil union, on the other hand, seems to successfully capture the spiritual 
aspect of the relationship. It suggests a committed and lasting relationship, something 
not necessarily evident in “domestic partnership” or certainly not in “reciprocal 
beneficiary,” which is open to brothers and sisters and other family members. The term 
“civil union” therefore stands a better chance of coming to stand for a relationship 
based on romance and deep spiritual commitment. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 137. It seems inherently a variation on separate but equal. See supra note 111 and 
accompanying text. 
 138. See supra Part II. 
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almost exactly as well as a civil union.139 The uncertain meanings of 
domestic partnership make this innovation less likely to provoke 
backlash, and the accretion of numerous variations on a theme of 
domestic partnership makes each new measure so labeled less likely 
to draw attention.140 Because of these advantages, same-sex marriage 
supporters might plausibly choose to favor—and pursue at the state, 
municipal, and corporate level—domestic partnership along with 
their current enthusiastic efforts to gain Massachusetts-style 
marriage, and their less enthusiastic efforts to obtain civil unions 
from state legislatures around the country. 
One important beyond-conjugality contribution of both civil 
unions and state-level domestic partnerships is that these two legal 
statuses are both defined by relatively recent legislation: state statutes 
that do not implicitly contain, as “marriage” may, any reference to 
past or continuing sexual intercourse.141 Provisions that deny these 
 
 139. Compare, from the right, L. Lynn Hogue, State Choice-of-Law Doctrine and Non-
Marital Same-Sex Partner Benefits: How Will States Enforce the Public Policy Exception?, 3 
AVE MARIA L. REV. 549, 550 (2005) (commenting on the breadth of domestic partnership in 
California) with, from the left, Nancy D. Polikoff, Making Marriage Matter Less: The ALI’s 
Domestic Partner Principles Are One Step in the Right Direction, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 353, 
378 n.161 (calling the California domestic partnership statute “expansive” and quoting from the 
California Family Code: domestic partnership offers “the same rights, protections and benefits 
and . . . responsibilities, obligations, and duties under law as are granted to and imposed on 
spouses”). 
 140.  
So why did the New Jersey law attract so little comment? The answer is probably that 
protections for domestic partners are becoming commonplace enough that each 
incremental development is no longer earth-shattering news. And the normalization of 
domestic partnerships is itself notable—the sign of a dramatic cultural sea change.  
Grossman, supra note 131. 
 141. The closest they come to such a demand is occasionally requiring “a committed 
relationship of mutual caring,” see, for example, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:8A-4(b)(6) (West 2006), 
which may evoke a shared bed but is also consistent with the not-necessarily-sexual 
interdependency of Beyond Conjugality. Other versions of domestic partnership are less 
permissive and might be read to demand conjugality. See, e.g., Minneapolis Code of 
Ordinances ch. 142, http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/domestic-partnerregistration/docs/chapter 
142.pdf (requiring that domestic partners be “committed to one another to the same extent as 
married persons and to each other,” except for the traditional marital status and solemnities); 
UNIV. OF WIS. SYS., AFFIDAVIT OF DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP 2 (n.d.), available at 
www.uwsa.edu/hr/benefits/ins/uws50.pdf (asking domestic partners to declare that they 
participate in “the functional equivalent of a marriage . . . which includes all of the following,” 
and going on to recite marriage-mimicry of a precise and old-fashioned sort, including “mutual 
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two statuses to opposite-sex couples and blood relatives insist that 
neither party to the new couple already be married to someone and 
limit the number of participants in the status to two indicate that the 
intended beneficiaries of this statutory expansion are same-sex 
sexually connected couples rather than individuals bonded to other 
persons in nonsexual ways. Yet because legislatures write domestic 
partnership and civil union laws on a cleaner slate, their choice not to 
demand a sexual connection suggests possibilities for future 
expansion away from conjugality. A future reader of these early 
statutes might find them radical less for their tolerance of homosexual 
affiliation than for their explicit lack of interest in any anatomical 
fitting-together. 
5. Common Law Marriage for the Twenty-First Century 
Following the lead of feminist legal scholar Cynthia Grant 
Bowman, who at the end of the twentieth century made feminist 
claims about what common law marriage might offer vulnerable 
women,142 same-sex marriage activists can consider the usefulness of 
common law marriage to their cause. As an informal method of 
achieving the consequences of matrimony, common law marriage has 
not appeared progressive to most observers for decades. Reformers 
(some of whom talked about progress, even if their motives included 
eugenics, racism, or the protection of business interests) brought 
down common law marriage from its status as a majority rule in the 
nineteenth century to a minority rule today.143 Bowman laments this 
development, contending that “the institution of common law 
 
caring and commitment” and “mutual fidelity,” apparently intended as synonymous with sexual 
exclusivity). 
 The role of sexual intercourse in the legal definition of marriage has never been clear. Lack 
of capacity to complete this act is the classic ground for annulment, but an unconsummated 
marriage remains valid as long as both husband and wife do not complain about the absence of 
sex. See generally Bernstein, supra note 71, at 133 n.7 (quoting the “definition” of family-law 
scholar Homer Clark: Marriage is “some sort of relationship between two individuals, of 
indeterminate duration, involving some kind of sexual conduct, entailing vague mutual property 
and support obligations, a relationship which may be formed by consent of both parties and 
dissolved at the will of either”). 
 142. Cynthia Grant Bowman, A Feminist Proposal to Bring Back Common Law Marriage, 
75 OR. L. REV. 709 (1996). 
 143. Id. passim. 
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marriage in fact was more effective at protecting the interests of 
women, especially poor women and women of color, than any of the 
theories suggested to handle the problems created by its abolition.”144 
So seen, common law marriage may not honor any ideal in principle, 
but can prove valuable for progressive ends.  
The counterpart value for subverting the defense-of-marriage 
crusade is diffusion among state laws. When couples can become 
pairs before the law without licenses or ceremonies, the distinction 
between married and unmarried blurs, and the meaning of any state 
law foreclosing marriage to some group of persons becomes thinner. 
Advocates of same-sex civil rights should be heartened by my 
inability to recite an accurate count of the number of American 
jurisdictions that accept common law marriage. Nine easy ones 
appear on every list: Alabama, Colorado, the District of Columbia, 
Iowa, Kansas, Montana, Rhode Island, South Carolina (home of the 
notorious “Big Chill” set where, according to one plaintiff, the actor 
William Hurt became a common law husband, with consequences to 
him that he did not desire145), and Texas.146 These states were part of 
the majority in the nineteenth century and simply declined to join the 
“heartbalm” abolition movement of the early twentieth.147 Other 
states, including Massachusetts and Illinois, have for more than a 
century taken a hard line against common law marriage.148 Opposite-
sex couples who hold no license but fulfill the traditional criteria for 
common law marriage know where they stand in Boston and 
Chicago. 
The abolition movement, however, sowed some valuable 
confusion. New York, for example, abolished common law marriage 
during the heartbalm 1930s149 but as a state has never appeared to 
loathe it the way some other states do. New York judges will not 
 
 144. Id. at 712. 
 145. The plaintiff lost; the court held that Jennings and Hurt did not fulfill the criteria for 
common law marriage. Jennings v. Hurt, 554 N.Y.S.2d 220 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990). 
 146. Demystifying Common Law Marriage, http://www.unmarried.org/common-law- 
marriage.html (last visited May 9, 2007). 
 147. See Bowman, supra note 142, at 731–54. 
 148. Id. at 710, 719–20. 
 149. Ariela R. Dubler, Wifely Behavior: A Legal History of Acting Married, 100 COLUM. L. 
REV. 957, 998–99 (2000). 
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infrequently determine that New Yorkers became married while 
spending short periods in jurisdictions that recognize the doctrine, so 
long as these couples fulfilled the checklist criteria for common law 
marriage.150 Elsewhere I have had occasion to note that one of the 
practical difficulties of “abolishing marriage” as a legal status is 
timing: If marriage will cease to enjoy recognition following 
abolition by the state, when do couples lose this status?151 The timing 
problem applied to this form of marriage has caused difficulty for 
several states. Today a handful recognize common law marriage for 
old unions and deny it for new ones.152 Oklahoma has had particular 
trouble trying to draw this line.153 Another line-blurring compromise 
is the law of New Hampshire, where common law marriage has been 
abolished for all purposes except inheritance154; this tiny degree of 
retention likely has had the effect of keeping common law marriage 
alive in the eyes of its citizens.155 Tennessee retains a unique variant 
on common law marriage, the doctrine of “marriage by estoppel,” 
although its courts have limited its application in recent decades.156 
Same-sex marriage activists might gain ironic pleasure from the 
law of Utah, whose relatively recent statutory change on common 
law marriage demonstrates how state legislatures can undermine state 
laws that deny marriage to same-sex couples. If common law 
marriage has value for subverting the defense-of-marriage crusade 
because it blurs the line between being married and unmarried, and 
lack of clarity on the question in state law makes the line even 
blurrier, as I have suggested, then this extremely conservative 
jurisdiction has rendered aid to its adversary.  
Utah’s provisions regarding common law marriage add up to the 
most perplexing law in the country on the subject. The Utah statute 
enacted in 1987, deems a man and a woman married without benefit 
 
 150. Bowman, supra note 142, at 717. 
 151. Bernstein, supra note 71, at 204–06. 
 152. These include Georgia, Idaho, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. See Demystifying Common 
Law Marriage, supra note 146. 
 153. Id.  
 154. Id.  
 155. Bowman, supra note 142, at 711 n.6 (noting that lay persons, even law students, tend 
to believe that common law marriage is much more prevalent, and easier to form, than it is). 
 156. See id. at 771–72. 
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of ceremony if they have fulfilled the traditional requirements of 
common law marriage and “a court or administrative order 
establishes” that they are married.157 The formal determination of 
common law marriage must be made during the relationship or within 
one year after it ends.158  
By combining the rigidity of majority-rule formal marriage with a 
denial that couples need a wedding ceremony to be married, the 
legislature must have confused Utahns—who were already bedeviled 
by the persistence of semi-condoned plural marriage in pockets of the 
state—about whether they need a rite to be joined in the eyes of the 
law.159 On its books this state has both a statute and a constitutional 
amendment denying marriage to same-sex couples, but on the 
question of common law marriage it has eschewed the boundary 
“defense” of sorting couples with a bright-line rule in the mode of 
Illinois. The persistence of common law marriage—and, lately in 
Utah, its renewal, which reminds us that changes in the doctrine are 
not unidirectionally limited to ‘heartbalm’ abolition—impedes 
legislative efforts to declare couples uncoupled in the eyes of the law. 
Ambiguity subverts the crusade.  
C. Less Overt Implementations 
1. The ALI Principles 
In recent years, the American Law Institute has issued what it 
calls Principles (as an alternative to its more familiar Restatements) 
of particular bodies of law, to acknowledge an additional layer of 
ambition beyond extracting from case law the soundest judicial 
 
 157. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4.5(1) (2006). 
 158. Id. § 30-1-4.5(2) (West Supp. 2006). 
 159. Bowman explains the Utah legislature’s maneuver as motivated by a desire to prevent 
couples from excluding one person’s income for purpose of calculating welfare benefits. 
Bowman, supra note 142, at 749–50. It may not have been necessary: for decades the law of 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children had had a category of “adult male assuming the role 
of spouse,” and anyone so labeled had an obligation to support his quasi-spouse’s children. Id. 
at 750. Thus “in California, while there are no common-law husbands under the Civil Code, 
there are common-law stepfathers under the Welfare and Institutions Code.” Id. (citing Jacobus 
tenBroek, California’s Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development, and Present 
Status, 17 STAN. L. REV. 614, 620 (1965)). 
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decisions. As described by the director of the Institute, the Principles 
category seeks to “analyze all law on a subject—judicial, legislative, 
and administrative—as well as relevant research and expert views . . . 
and then speak” to a newly widened audience, including lawmakers 
in foreign countries.160 In its Principles, the ALI makes “no pretense 
of being bound by existing law. [Principles] are explicit 
recommendations for change.”161  
Published in 2002, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution 
was the second volume in the ALI Principles series and the Institute’s 
first comprehensive work on family law.162 Its three reporters, set free 
of the task of restatement, went throughout the volume where 
American courts and legislatures had not yet gone. Most 
dramatically, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution recognizes 
domestic partners, a designation whose indeterminancy we have 
already noted. On dissolution, the work advocates treating domestic 
partners (for most purposes) as if they had been spouses.163 
The Principles recommend focusing on whether two individuals 
had shared life as a couple. The black letter recommendation in 
Section 6.03, entitled “Determination That Persons Are Domestic 
Partners,” gives a list of nonexclusive criteria to consider for couples 
who had shared a residence.164 Conjugality appears on the list, but 
only at about eighth out of thirteen:  
Whether persons share a life together as a couple is determined 
by reference to all the circumstances, including:  
(a) the oral or written statements or promises made to one 
another, or representations jointly made to third parties, 
regarding their relationship; (b) the extent to which the parties 
intermingled their finances; (c) the extent to which their 
 
 160. LANCE LIEBMAN, AM. LAW INST., REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: AMERICAN LAW 
INSTITUTE ANNUAL REPORT (2006), www.ali.org/ali/pa-DirectorsRpt06.pdf. 
 161. Harvey S. Perlman, The Restatement Process, 10 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 2, 4 (2000). 
 162. Press Release, Am. Law Inst., American Law Institute Publishes Principles of the Law 
of Family Dissolution (May 15, 2002), available at http://www.ali.org/ali/pr051502.htm. 
 163. See AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, at ch. 6 
(2002) (endorsing the application of family law, rather than contract law, to non-marital 
cohabitants, and advocating an emphasis on the character of the relationship as it developed 
over time rather than on statements of intention that the parties may have made). 
 164. Id. § 6.03(3). 
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relationship fostered the parties’ economic interdependence, or 
the economic dependence of one party upon the other; (d) the 
extent to which the parties engaged in conduct and assumed 
specialized or collaborative roles in furtherance of their life 
together; (e) the extent to which the relationship wrought 
change in the life of either or both parties; (f) the extent to 
which the parties acknowledged responsibilities to each other, 
as by naming the other the beneficiary of life insurance or of a 
testamentary instrument, or as eligible to receive benefits 
under an employee-benefit plan; (g) the extent to which the 
parties’ relationship was treated by the parties as qualitatively 
distinct from the relationship either party had with any other 
person; (h) the emotional or physical intimacy of the parties’ 
relationship; (i) the parties’ community reputation as a couple; 
(j) the parties’ participation in a commitment ceremony or 
registration as a domestic partnership; (k) the parties’ 
participation in a void or voidable marriage that, under 
applicable law, does not give rise to the economic incidents of 
marriage; (l) the parties’ procreation of, adoption of, or joint 
assumption of parental functions toward a child; (m) the 
parties’ maintenance of a common household, as defined by 
Paragraph (4).165 
Assessing the Principles, family law scholar and beyond- 
conjugality activist-reformer Nancy Polikoff praises them for their 
important move from the sexual dyad and also notes a crucial way in 
which they do not move far enough: Polikoff observes that although 
the Principles recite their thirteen factors as flexible, the requirement 
of a shared residence is rigid.166 A marriage license eliminates the 
burden of living together as a condition of winning recognition: 
“Married couples, of course, can live separately.”167 Polikoff also 
deems two of the reporters, Ira Mark Ellman and Grace Ganz 
Blumberg, insufficiently proud of their handiwork.168 In her view, the 
 
 165. Id. § 6.03(7). 
 166. Polikoff, supra note 139, at 353. 
 167. Id. at 356. Polikoff proposes that a shared residence be probative of domestic-partner 
status, rather than an absolute requirement. Id. 
 168. Id. 
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reporters should have reveled in the derogation of marriage that they 
wrote into Section 6.03, rather than agree with conservative critics 
that marriage is better than other ways of forming a relationship.169 
Quibbles notwithstanding, Polikoff acclaims the Principles for 
having declared boldly “that the decision to marry should matter little 
in distributing rights and responsibilities, both between partners and 
between the couple and the state,”170 and, less explicitly, that 
conjugality vel non does not define a relationship.171 These 
declarations will likely inform the law’s response to future 
dissolutions of all kinds of human unions, not just the conjugal 
sort.172 
2. The Moving Hearth: Domestic Violence Reenvisioned  
Just as Nancy Polikoff reinterpreted the centrist-progressive 
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution as fitting into a more 
radical pattern that would eliminate conjugality from the law, Ruth 
Colker has spotted beyond-conjugality seeds in another garden where 
nobody intended to plant them: the law related to domestic 
violence.173 Colker’s vision takes domestic violence from its more 
familiar classifications—social pathology, psychological devastation, 
and unevenly prosecuted crime—to a locus of privilege, recognition, 
and opportunity.  
Following the lonely feminist struggles in the 1970s against the 
family-values religious right and an indifferent, if not hostile, law 
enforcement establishment, domestic violence leaped toward 
mainstream acceptance when the Reagan administration issued a 
report encouraging states to require warrantless arrests for family 
 
 169. Id. at 362. 
 170. Id. at 379. 
 171. Id.  
 172. Published decisional law has not yet relied on the Principles for the dissolution of a 
nonconjugal relationship, but courts have started to cite them in the conjugal-but-non-marital 
context. See, e.g., In re Custody of Kali, 792 N.E.2d 635, 641 (Mass. 2003) (citing the 
Principles in a child custody dispute involving non-marital parents); Stitham v. Henderson, 768 
A.2d 598, 602 (Me. 2001) (recognizing rights of non-marital father); Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 
A.2d 959, 974–75 (R.I. 2000) (noting that the court’s decision to recognize rights of a 
grandparent was consistent with the then-draft Principles’ emphasis on a caregiving history). 
 173. See Ruth Colker, Marriage Mimicry: The Law of Domestic Violence, 47 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1841 (2006). 
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violence.174 “By 1988, forty states had enhanced their criminal law 
policies with respect to domestic violence,” Colker notes, reciting the 
“seven types of measures” that states adopted: “mandatory arrest, 
primary aggressor language in mandatory arrest statute, warrantless 
arrest, mandatory arrest for restraining order violation, requirement 
that spousal abuse be considered in custody determinations, 
mandatory police training, and mandatory statewide data 
collection.”175  
Current law now presumes “that domestic violence is worse than 
other kinds of violence,”176 and current policy finances this 
presumption with such expensive goods as shelters and victim-
assistance programs.177 To Colker, these changes bespeak a 
dangerous “marriage mimicry” that leaves classes of women exposed 
and unprotected.178 These classes include “women who have gone on 
a few dates with their abuser” but formed no long-term relationship; 
women who never lived with their abusers; “women who have been 
abused by men who are married to other women”; women who live 
very close to an abuser but not inside his household; and women in a 
range of family, quasi-family, and step-family relations with 
abusers.179 Colker urges lawmakers to consider what really drives 
their budgets: it cannot be “intimate violence” or “household 
violence,”180 but seems instead focused on what might be called 
marriage-mimicry violence. Reminiscent of Beyond Conjugality, in 
this domestic violence context Colker advocates what she calls a 
functional approach.181 
 
 174. Id. at 1851–54. 
 175. Id. at 1854–55. 
 176. Id. at 1882. 
 177. See Allison Stevens, Budget Falls Short for Domestic Violence Programs, WOMEN’S 
E-NEWS, Feb. 17, 2006, http://www.womensenews.org/article.cfm/dyn/aid/2641 (reporting that 
federal legislation authorized spending of up to a billion dollars on shelters and related 
programs during fiscal 2007). 
 178. Colker, supra note 173, at 1881. 
 179. Id.  
 180. Id. at 1868 (noting that “intimate violence” cannot be the concern because policies 
provide no recourse to women who rebuff advances after one date or who are battered by 
intimate partners married to other women, and that “household violence” does not work either, 
because the law does not protect a woman who is battered by a man with whom she is not 
intimate and who lives in her apartment or boarding house). 
 181. Id. at 1841. 
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Without differing with this critique of current laws and policies 
relating to domestic violence, one might also note the measures 
Colker describes that have taken critical steps toward functionality, 
even while mimicking marriage. As diction, “domestic violence” 
represents an improvement over the literally matrimonial “wife 
beating” and “battered wife,” phrases that appear to be on their way 
out of legal discourse.182 Marriage-mimicking legal criteria that 
victims need to show when they want the benefits of domestic 
violence protection—such as “a substantive dating or engagement 
relationship” in Massachusetts,183 “a dating relationship” where “the 
parties are romantically involved over time” in North Carolina,184 and 
“residing together as if in a family” in Florida185—justifiably affront 
Colker because of their unwillingness to assist hurt individuals who 
fail the test186 and their middle-class bias,187 yet they also create 
opportunities to move the hearth. Similarly, when Colker disapproves 
of the test that some states use to determine whether a couple is 
cohabiting on the perfectly reasonable ground that vulnerable women 
have been deprived of an order of protection that would make them 
safer after judges faulted their compliance with the criteria,188 she 
does not acknowledge the liberating possibilities of indeterminate, 
multi-factor criteria that can make an unmarried woman, for these 
limited purposes, as good as a wife. 
A colleague of Colker’s at the Moritz College of Law found an 
application for subversives in her work. Marc Spindelman reviewed 
the clash between Ohio’s severe anti-marriage amendment, which 
prohibits the state from recognizing anything like marital status in 
persons who are not literally married, and the generous expansion of 
domestic-violence protections that Colker documented.189 He 
 
 182. To get a rough sense of the relative popularity of these two terms, I typed “battered 
wi! and date aft 2001” into the Allrev database of Lexis, and retrieved 163 hits. “Domestic 
violence and date aft 2001” yielded the “Error: More than 3000 Results!” response that Lexis 
gives searchers who ask for too much. 
 183. Colker, supra note 173, at 1859. 
 184. Id.  
 185. Id. at 1861. 
 186. Id. at 1860–61. 
 187. Id. at 1869. 
 188. Id. at 1863–65. 
 189. Marc Spindelman, The Honeymoon’s Over, LEGAL TIMES (Wash., D.C.), June 12, 
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reported that when opponents of the Ohio constitutional amendment 
had expressed worries that the measure would impede domestic 
violence protections, proponents “pooh-poohed” the concern, calling 
it “absolutely absurd” and “a lot of hypotheticals.”190 Tellingly, 
however, the person credited as the author of Ohio’s harsh marriage 
amendment, David Langdon, filed an amicus brief in one of the state 
cases challenging the domestic violence law that took this “absurd,” 
lot-of-hypotheticals position: Ohio may not extend domestic violence 
protection to unmarried persons, Langdon argued, because under the 
amendment only the married can be so protected.191  
If domestic violence victims are entitled to a protective exception 
from the harsh constitutional amendment, then the same reasoning 
would support relief for other unmarried-but-worthy claimants.192 
And if domestic violence victims can obtain no such clemency, under 
present attitudes that deplore domestic violence so intensely, the anti-
marriage amendment and its proponents are at least embarrassed. No 
matter how courts resolve the clash between severe marriage 
amendments and domestic violence protections, Spindelman chortled, 
“cultural conservatives will lose.”193 
3. Workplace Innovations 
“The nuclear family has gone the way of soda fountain counters,” 
wrote journalist Susanna Duff in 1998, “and with it went the clear-cut 
definition of a dependent.”194 Though perhaps rushing to inter heavy 
traditions before they were dead, in her news story Duff presented 
themes related to subverting the defense-of-marriage crusade. Similar 
to the clash in Ohio between domestic violence legislation and the 
state’s harsh anti-marriage amendment, controversies over employee 
 
2006, at 66. 
 190. Id. at 67 (quoting Phil Burress of the Ohio group Citizens for Community Values). 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. (referring to another Ohio case in which opponents of same-sex relationships 
sought to invalidate the limited domestic-partnership benefits available at one of the state’s 
public universities). 
 193. Id. at 66. 
 194. Susanna Duff, New Family Definitions Reach Dependent Coverage, EMPLOYEE 
BENEFIT NEWS (Wash., D.C.), Dec. 1, 1998, reprinted at http://www.unmarriedamerica.org/ 
members/extended-family-article.htm. 
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health benefits may have boxed in opponents of same-sex marriage. 
In 1996 San Francisco required all organizations doing business with 
the city to offer domestic partnership benefits to same-sex couples; 
the San Francisco Archdiocese of the Roman Catholic Church 
resisted.195 Church and city reached accord in the bland designation 
of adult dependents, allowing Archdiocese employees to share their 
health insurance with persons other than homosexual lovers.196 This 
tactical choice by the Church laid the groundwork for less marriage-
centric employee benefits.  
The concept of an “other adult dependent” now flourishes in a few 
brave human resources manuals around the United States: Bank of 
America, Prudential Insurance, State Street Bank, Merrill Lynch, and 
Citigroup have recognized the beyond-conjugality relation of one 
employed adult who is connected to a person outside the traditional, 
IRS-recognized categories of spouse and young child.197 The policy 
installed at Merrill Lynch & Co. in 1999 is illustrative.198 Each 
employee may extend her or his health insurance to cover one other 
adult.199 This person may be a wife, husband, same-sex conjugal 
partner, or extended family member.200 Being married does not 
constrain the choice: a married employee can extend this health 
insurance either to a spouse or another qualified adult.201  
CONCLUSION 
Activists working in support of same-sex marriage appear to have 
fended off an anti-marriage amendment to the United States 
 
 195. Id.  
 196. Id.  
 197. Lucille M. Ponte & Jennifer L. Gillan, From Our Family to Yours: Rethinking the 
“Beneficial Family” and Marriage-Centric Corporate Benefit Programs, 14 COLUM. J. 
GENDER & L. 1, 72–74 (2005). 
 198. The Human Rights Campaign posts a detailed description of the Merrill Lynch plan 
on its website. Human Rights Campaign Foundation, Merrill Lynch & Co., http://www.hrc.org/ 
Template.cfm?Section=search_the_database&Template=/customsource/workNet/srch_dtl.crmsr
chtype=QS&searched+1&orgid=1151 (last visited Nov. 11, 2006). 
 199. Id.  
 200. Id.  
 201. MERRILL LYNCH, QUESTIONS & ANSWERS ON QUALIFIED ADULT HEALTH COVERAGE 
(n.d.), available at http://www.hrc.org/ContentGroups/Workplace1/Sample_Policies/merril 
lynch.pdf. 
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Constitution, but also have been losing most of their direct, squared-
off fights over state legislation and constitutional amendments. 
Continuing down this path of defeat would result in a large roster of 
state constitutions that classify same-sex couples as inferior to their 
opposite-sex counterparts in the eyes of the law. For better results, 
individuals who favor marriage equality should consider a contrary 
strategy, in the spirit of Emily Dickinson’s injunction to “tell all the 
Truth but tell it Slant.”202  
This Article has advocated the tell-it-slant strategy of diffusion. 
Without ceasing to demand parity between same-sex and opposite-
sex couples in marriage law and policy, believers in this civil rights 
cause should work to reform those areas of the law where marital 
status and resource distribution can be uncoupled.203 This strategy, 
called “beyond conjugality” in the title of a Canadian government 
report, rests on a premise that sexual affiliation of itself does not 
generate much of interest to the state, but family conditions, 
especially dependency and support, do pertain to law and policy.  
Numerous uncouplings in this direction already exist and can 
inspire reformers to continue.204 One key truth about conjugality is 
that sexual pairing becomes the government’s business only when it 
affects dependency and support. Telling this truth “slant” would 
subvert the defense-of-marriage crusade better than any of the state-
level battles over marriage waged to date. 
The strategy would have another incidental benefit: it eases an 
impasse that now divides marriage-rights activists over whether to 
 
 202. Emily Dickinson, Tell all the Truth but Tell It Slant, available at http://www. 
poemhunter.com/p/m/poem.asp?poem=0&poet=3053&num=773. 
Tell all the Truth but tell it slant— 
 Success in Circuit lies 
 Too bright for our infirm Delight 
 The Truth’s superb surprise 
 As Lightening to the Children eased 
 With explanation kind 
 The Truth must dazzle gradually 
 Or every man be blind— 
Id. 
 203. See supra note 160. 
 204. See supra Part II (recounting areas in which American law has modified its emphasis 
on the conjugal family). 
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pursue marriage-and-only-marriage or abandon marriage as 
unattainable for the time being and seek less ambitious civil rights 
law reform, such as enacting civil unions and domestic partnership at 
the state level.205 Scattering into remote corners of the law to change 
the boons and banes attached to marital status presents a third way—
and, like other variants on “the third way,”206 which I do not intend 
here to endorse, it escapes extremes. A diffusion strategy may be 
labeled both more conservative and more radical than prevailing 
tactics in the marriage wars: It is more conservative, because it makes 
no demands for new recognitions now withheld, and more radical, 
because it shakes the notion that matrimony should determine what 
individuals receive from their conjugal partners, third parties, and the 
state.
 
 205. For an overview of this disagreement, see James M. Donovan, Baby Steps or One Fell 
Swoop? The Incremental Extension of Rights Is not a Defensible Strategy, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 
1 (2001) (favoring the “one fell swoop” approach). 
 206. See, e.g., Democratic Leadership Council, About the Third Way, June 1, 1998, 
http://www.ndol.org/ndol_ci.cfm?kaid=128&subid=187&contentid=895; Third Way: A 
Strategy Center for Progressives, http://www.third-way.com. 
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